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In her commentary (Dreßing this collection) on my target article (Pacherie this
collection), Dreßing suggests that the story I offer is not just a creation myth but
also an attempt to give an explanation of the function of conscious intentions in
the physical world and as such answerable to both metaphysical and empirical
constraints. Here, I  try to clarify which of my claims should be understood as
simply speculations about the origins of our capacity of intentions and which I
take to be empirical claims. In response to the metaphysical and empirical chal-
lenge Dreßing raises, I argue that Dretske’s distinction between structuring and
triggering causes may help us see how explanations in terms of physical proper-
ties and explanations in terms of mental properties may not compete but rather
complement each other. I argue that this distinction may also help us assuage
certain worries raised by neuroscientific findings.
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1 Introduction
In her commentary, Andrea Dreßing (this collec-
tion) suggests that I might have been too timid
in calling the story I tell about the social func-
tion of intentions in my target article (Pacherie
this collection) a creation myth. She encourages
me take a bolder stance, claiming that the story
I offer is not just a myth but also an attempt to
give an explanation of the function of conscious
intentions in the physical world. Indeed, part of
my story is intended as more than a myth and
so my first task here will be to clarify where I
draw  the  line  between  empirical  claims  and
myths. 
Dreßing also points out that an explana-
tion, as opposed to a mere myth, has to fit into
the  framework  of  current  scientific  knowledge
and is  therefore  subject  to both metaphysical
constraints and empirical constraints. I concur.
In what follows, I will argue, however, that my
general predicament with regard to conceptual
or metaphysical constraints is  not so different
from the predicament of the other myth-tellers I
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discuss in my article, as Dreßing suggests. Nor
indeed is it direr than the predicament all philo-
sophers  of  mind working within a naturalistic
framework face. Finally, certain empirical find-
ings have been interpreted as showing that con-
scious  intentions  play  no  role  in  action  initi-
ation. I also try to address this challenge.
2 Myths vs. empirical claims
In my target article, I use the phrase “creation
myth” first  as  a  dramatization device.  Typic-
ally, we do not feel the urge to formulate myths
about things we deem insignificant. Talking of a
social creation myth was thus a way of emphas-
izing the importance of the social function of in-
tentions, a function largely neglected in tradi-
tional  accounts  of  intentions.  Second,  I  also
wanted, following Velleman (2007), to convey a
note of caution. A myth, as Dreßing points out,
can neither be falsified nor empirically verified.
It  offers  a  possible  explanation  about  a  phe-
nomenon, without making a claim about truth.
But I perhaps wasn’t clear enough what I was
trying to be cautious about and where I drew
the  line  between  empirical  claims  and  ulti-
mately unverifiable explanations. So let me now
draw this line more firmly.
To do this, let me distinguish three differ-
ent questions about intentions and examine how
they may relate. The three questions are:  what
roles or functions (in a non-teleological sense)
do intentions play in human agency?  How can
intentions play these roles? Why do we have in-
tentions in the first place? In my view the what-
and how-questions are both empirical questions
for which mythical answers won’t do. The why-
question, as I understand it, is a question about
the origins of capacity for intention. How come
we have  such a  capacity?  Why was  it  estab-
lished? 
The focus of  the account I  proposed,  as
well as the focus of the alternative accounts by
Bratman (1987),  Anscombe (1963), and  Velle-
man (2007) with which I contrast it in my art-
icle,  is  on the  what-  and  why-questions.  How-
ever, I offered my story as a creation myth only
to the extent that it was meant to address the
why-question. As answers offered to the  what-
question,  my  claims  were  meant  as  empirical
claims. I take it that the claims made by Brat-
man, Anscombe, and Velleman about the epi-
stemic  and  pragmatic  functions  of  intentions,
when understood as answers to the  what-ques-
tion,  should  also  be  interpreted  as  empirical
claims. 
Now, how do the what- and the why-ques-
tions relate? One way to relate them is by as-
suming that intentions do not just have a func-
tion  or  functions  in  a  value-neutral  sense—
things that they do—but a teleofunction in the
evolutionary sense, that is, something that they
do that confers some benefit  or advantage on
creatures with a capacity for intentions, and in
this sense explains why these creatures have this
capacity. 
Velleman  cautions  us  against  this  teleo-
functional move. First, as his discussion of Brat-
man’s  and  Anscombe’s  accounts  makes  clear,
the what-question about intentions can be given
complementary answers in terms of both prag-
matic and epistemic roles, leaving us with sev-
eral possible teleological stories. Second, Velle-
man also warns us against assuming direct links
between answers to the  what-question and an-
swers to the  why-question. The spandrel story
he tells is meant to suggest that a capacity for
intentions may only be a by-product of  other
capacities and thus that our capacity for inten-
tions could be nothing more than an (admit-
tedly very fortunate) accident. Finally, in call-
ing his own story a creation myth as well, Velle-
man is also pointing out that our speculations
about the origins of intentions are most likely
beyond falsification or empirical verification. 
Similarly,  in  offering  my  social  function
story as an answer to the  why-question, I was
not making a claim to truth. Rather, I was try-
ing to broaden the terms of the debate to also
include consideration of the social dimension of
intentions. If we are considering what possible
teleofunction  intentions  could  have,  then  we
should pay more attention to the benefits  we
derive from being able to act jointly in a flexible
manner.  If  we  are  tempted  by  a  story  that
views a capacity for intention as simply a by-
product of more general capacities, then, among
these  more  general  capacities,  we  should  pay
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serious heed to our capacity for  sociality and
cooperativeness. 
Turning now to the relations between the
what-question  and the  how-question,  I  take  it
that the empirical standing of an answer to the
what-question  ultimately  depends  on  whether
this answer can be backed up by a convincing
answer to the corresponding how-question. The
validity of any empirical claim about the causal
roles of intentions in human agency will remain
in doubt unless one can see how it is at all pos-
sible for intentions to play these roles (Dreßing’s
metaphysical  constraints),  and it  will  also  re-
main in doubt if appears to be in contradiction
with well-established empirical facts (Dreßing’s
metaphysical constraints). 
Since my claims about the functions of in-
tentions qua answers to the  what- rather than
the  why-question  are  intended  as  empirical
claims, they are not insulated from these meta-
physical and empirical worries. Let me address
them in turn.
3 Metaphysical worries
Dreßing points  out that my claim that inten-
tions have a causal role to play in the online
control of action confronts me with the problem
of mental causation. She also suggests that this
problem is more pressing for me than it is for
the accounts of the functions of intentions pro-
posed  by  Bratman  and  Anscombe.  While  I
agree that the problem of mental causation is
an issue for me, I disagree with her assessment
that  it  isn’t  as  serious  a  worry for  these  ac-
counts. 
First,  let  me  clarify  that  when  I  talk
about  conscious  intentions  and  their  causal
role,  I  am  concerned  with  what  Ned Block
(1995)  calls  access  consciousness  rather  than
with  phenomenal  consciousness.  In  other
words,  my  claims  are  about  intentions  qua
conscious states exploiting and conveying in-
formation  globally  available  in  the  cognitive
system for the purposes of reasoning, speech,
and high-level action control. My account thus
faces  the  “easy”  problems  of  consciousness
rather  than  the  “hard”  problem  (Chalmers
1995).  I  share  Chalmers sanguine assessment
about  phenomena  pertaining  to  access  con-
sciousness: 
There is no real issue about whether these
phenomena can be explained scientifically.
All of them are straightforwardly vulner-
able to explanation in terms of computa-
tional  or  neural  mechanisms.  (1995,  p.
201)
This is  not to say, however, that in confining
oneself  to  phenomena  of  access  consciousness
one can eschew all metaphysical conundrums. In
particular, as pointed out by Dreßing, the mere
fact that Cartesian dualism has fallen out of fa-
vour and that the vast majority of philosophers
and cognitive scientists are nowadays willing to
embrace  some  form  of  materialist  monism
doesn’t  insure  the  dissolution  of  philosophical
worries about mental causation. The version of
the  problem of  mental  causation that  non-re-
ductive physicalists,  whatever  their  exact  per-
suasion, are confronted with is the Causal Ex-
clusion Problem: how could  mental  properties
play a causal role given that they appear to be
screened off by their physical realizers?
Dreßing argues that this problem is more
pressing  for  my  view than  for  the  pragmatic
(Bratman)  or  the  epistemic  (Anscombe)  cre-
ation myths, the reason being that these latter
two  teleological  myths  are  about  prior  inten-
tions and that neither “require any assumption
about causality, as they do not involve a mind-
world  directed  causality,  but  rather  an  intra-
mental  mental  causality”  (Dreßing this collec-
tion, p. 6). Dreßing also claims that Velleman’s
view does not imply any explicit  claim about
causality  either,  since  on  this  view  intentions
are a spandrel or a by-product. 
I  disagree with this assessment for three
reasons. First, as I explained in section 2, while
the  speculative  character  of  these  stories  qua
answers  to  the  why-question  may  justify  la-
belling them as creation myths, the stories also
offer answers to the  what-question. In that re-
gard their claims about the epistemic or prag-
matic roles of intentions should be taken as em-
pirical claims. Thus, even if we go along with
Velleman’s claim that a capacity for intentions
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is a spandrel and that the epistemic and prag-
matic functions of intentions are not teleofunc-
tions, they are nevertheless functions in the or-
dinary functionalist sense and we still need an
explanation  of  how  intentions  can  play  these
epistemic and pragmatic roles. 
Second, the Causal Exclusion Problem is a
problem for anyone espousing a non-reductive
form  of  materialist  monism,1 whether  their
primary concern is with intra-mental causation
or with mind–world causation. Suppose that a
state  S has the mental  property  M (e.g.,  the
property of being an intention to go to London
on  Monday)  and a  physical  basis  P,  suppose
that  S’ has the mental property  M’ (e.g., the
property of being an intention to buy a train
ticket to London) and a physical basis  P’, and
suppose that  S’’ has the mental property  M’’
(e.g., the property of being a being a belief that
one will go to London on Monday) and a phys-
ical basis  P’’. On a Bratmanian pragmatic ac-
count of intentions, I would want to be able to
say  that  my  intention  to  go  to  London  on
Monday causes, via further means-end reason-
ing,  my intention to buy a ticket to London.
But how can the mental property M of S play a
causal  role  in  bringing about a state  S’ with
mental property  M’, given that they appear to
be screened off by the physical properties P and
P’? Similarly, with regard to the epistemic func-
tion of intentions, how could I say that my in-
tention to go to London on Monday causes my
belief  that  I  will  go  to  London  on  Monday,
given that mental properties M and M’’ appear
to be screened off by the physical properties P
and P’’?
Third, while it is true that on Bratman’s
account  future-directed  intentions  may  only
cause  behaviour  through  the  mediation  of
present-directed intentions, still Bratman insists
that the whole point of having a capacity for in-
tentions is to produce behaviour that contrib-
1 While this issue is not at the heart of Bratman’s preoccupations, I
think we can safely assume that he would want his account of inten-
tions  to  be  compatible  with  physicalism.  I  won’t  dwell  here  on
Anscombe’s metaphysical view, except to say that she was no mater-
ialist  herself  but  was  also  highly  suspicious  of  Cartesian  dualism
(Anscombe 2008). Suffice it to say that many of the philosophers
who nowadays embrace the view that intentions have an epistemic
function, would want this claim to be compatible with a physicalist
stance. 
utes in the long run to our securing greater de-
sire-satisfaction. Similarly, on a reliabilist read-
ing of Anscombe’s epistemic claim that inten-
tions embody knowledge of our actions, they do
so because intentions reliably cause what they
represent. As  Velleman puts it, “[u]nless an in-
tention with the content ‘I’m going to move my
toe’ reliably causes my toe to move,  it  won’t
amount  to  practical  knowledge”  (Velleman
2007, p. 201).  Thus, Bratman, Anscombe and
Velleman cannot be exonerated from the task of
explaining how mental states  can cause beha-
viour. 
With  respect  to  the  problem  of  mental
causation,  we  are  all  in  the  same  boat.  The
metaphysical standing of my account is no less
or more precarious than the standing of these
other accounts. Are we then all metaphysically
doomed? Readers should not hold their breath;
I  have  no  new,  unassailable  solution  to  the
problem of  mental  causation  to  offer.  Yet,  it
would certainly be premature to claim that the
problem of mental causation is insoluble. Many
lines of  response have been proposed and are
currently being explored (for a review, see Robb
& Heil 2014). I cannot discuss all these accounts
here. Let me just say that the approach I find
most congenial stems from Fred Dretske’s work
(Dretske 1988,  2004) on psychological explana-
tions  of  behaviour.  Dretske  distinguishes
between  triggering  causes  and  structuring
causes, where a triggering cause is an event that
initiates or triggers a causal chain of events, and
a structuring cause the cause of the process or
setup that makes a given triggering cause pro-
duce the effect it does. To take an example from
Dretske (2004),  moving  a  computer  mouse  is
the  triggering  cause  of  cursor  movement,  but
hardware and programming are the structuring
causes  of  cursor  movement.  Dretske’s  central
claim is that mental states and events are best
analysed as structuring rather  than triggering
causes of behaviour. On this view there is  no
competition between physical and psychological
or mental explanations, since they have differ-
ent  explananda.  While  the  triggering  physical
properties  explain  bodily  motion,  i.e.,  explain
why bodily motions occur at a certain point in
time, the structuring mental properties explain
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behavior,  i.e.,  they  explain  why  in  circum-
stances of a certain sort, bodily motions of this
kind rather than that kind are produced. 
Much work remains to be done in order
for us to understand more precisely how struc-
tural causes operate and in particular how they
can do so in  the dynamic way needed to ac-
count for the plasticity and flexibility of human
behaviour. In this respect, Dretske’s account re-
mains largely under-developed (for recent work
on this  issue,  see  e.g.,  Slors 2015;  Wu 2011).
Dretske’s  approach  in  terms  of  structuring
causes has the great merit, however, of offering
a  potential  solution  to  the  Causal  Exclusion
Problem and to let us see how explanations in
terms of physical properties and explanations in
terms  of  mental  properties  may  not  compete
but rather complement each other. As we will
now  see,  thinking  of  intentions  as  structural
causes of  action rather  than triggering causes
can also help us assuage certain empirical wor-
ries.
4 Empirical worries
The  claim  that  conscious  intentions  play  a
causal role in action production should be com-
patible  with  our  best  empirical  knowledge  on
how  action  is  produced.  The  main  empirical
worries this claim confronts come from neuros-
cientific findings that have been interpreted as
showing that the time of onset of conscious in-
tentions is not compatible with their being the
initiators of actions. 
The most famous of these experiments are
Libet’s studies on “readiness potential” (Libet
et al. 1983;  Libet 1985). In these studies, sub-
jects were asked to flex their wrist at will and
to note when they felt the urge to move by ob-
serving the position of a dot on a special clock.
While subjects were both acting and monitoring
their urges (intentions, decisions) to act, Libet
used an EEG to record the activity of prefrontal
motor areas. On average, participants reported
the  conscious  intention  to  act,  which  Libet
called  the  W-judgement,  about  200ms  before
the onset of  muscle  activity.  By contrast,  the
EEG revealed that preparatory brain activity,
termed  by  Libet  type  II  readiness  potential
(RP), preceded action onset by about 550ms. In
other words, their brains started preparing the
action at least 350ms before the participants be-
came aware of their intention to act. This led
Libet  to  the  conclusion  that  the  wrist-flexing
actions in his experiments were not initiated by
conscious intentions but were initiated instead
by the (unconscious) RPs.
These experiments and Libet’s interpreta-
tion of his findings have been widely discussed
(see  e.g.,  Banks &  Pockett 2007;  Bayne &
Pacherie 2014;  Mele 2009;  Nahmias 2002;
Pacherie 2014; Roskies 2011) and commentators
have pointed out  a number of  methodological
problems with Libet’s paradigm as well as con-
ceptual problems with his interpretation of his
results.  Let  me focus first  on one methodolo-
gical problem and one attempt to address it. I
will then consider one conceptual problem 
Libet argues that it is the RP rather than
the conscious intention that initiate the agent’s
action. If RPs are the initiators of the action,
there  should  be  a  robust  correlation  between
them and the actions they cause: we should ex-
pect RP events to be “immediately” followed by
the appropriate action, or, to put it the other
way round, we should expect that when there is
no movement, there is also no RP event. As sev-
eral  commentators  have  observed  (e.g.,  Mele
2009;  Roskies 2011),  the  back-averaging  tech-
niques used in the experiment do not allow us
to ascertain whether this is indeed the case. Be-
cause the RP on any one trial is obscured by
neural  noise,  what  is  presented  as  “the  RP
data” is determined by averaging the data col-
lected on a large number of trials. In order to
compute this  average,  the EEG recordings on
different trials need to be aligned, and this re-
quires some fixed point that can be identified
across trials. Since in Libet’s experiments action
onset serves as the needed fixed point for the
alignment of EEG recordings, any RPs that are
not followed by an action simply won’t be meas-
ured, and so we don’t know how robust the cor-
relation between the RP and Libet-actions is.
In a recent experiment, Schurger and col-
leagues (Schurger et al. 2012) used a modified
Libet  task  to  circumvent  the  limitations  of
back-averaging  techniques.  Their  aim  was  to
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test the proposal that RPs correlate with pre-
decision activity rather than, as Libet proposed,
with  activity  that  coincides  with,  or  is  sub-
sequent to, the agent’s decision. Schurger and
colleagues  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that
the decisions of the participants in Libet’s ex-
periment can be  modelled—as neural  decision
tasks typically are—in terms of an accumulator-
plus-threshold  mechanism:  decisions  are  made
when relevant evidence accumulated over time
reaches  a  certain  threshold.  Given  that  in
Libet’s  task  subjects  are  explicitly  instructed
not to base their decision on any specific evid-
ence, Schurger and colleagues proposed in this
instance that the decision process amounts to
simply shifting premotor activation closer to the
threshold  for  initiation  of  the  movement  and
waiting for a random threshold-crossing fluctu-
ation in RP. Thus, Schurger and colleagues pre-
dicted the same premotor activation build-up as
Libet when a movement is produced. However,
whereas on Libet’s post-decision interpretation
of  this  build-up there  should be no premotor
activity (and hence no RPs) when no movement
is  produced,  on  Schurger  and  colleagues’
stochastic decision model there should be con-
tinuous random fluctuations in RPs even when
no  movement  is  produced.  Schurger  and  col-
leagues reasoned that it should be possible to
capture these fluctuations by interrupting sub-
jects in a Libet task with a compulsory response
cue and sorting trials by their reaction times.
On  the  assumption  that  the  interrupted  re-
sponses arise  from the same decision accumu-
lator as the self-initiated ones, and on the as-
sumption  that  close-to-threshold  activity  re-
flects  spontaneous  fluctuations  of  RPs  rather
than  mounting  preparation  to  move  building
over the course of the entire trial, slow and fast
reaction  times  should  be  distributed  equally
within trials. In their  Libetus Interruptus task,
they found,  as  they had predicted,  that  slow
and fast responses to interruptions were distrib-
uted equally throughout the time span of the
trial. 
These results cast serious doubt on Libet’s
claim that the neural decision to move coincides
with  the  onset  of  the  RP,  since  spontaneous
fluctuations of RPs happen all the time. There-
fore, they also cast doubt on his further claim
that since RP onset precedes the urge to move
by 350ms or more, conscious intentions can play
no role in the initiation of the movement. If in-
stead the neural decision to move coincides with
a  much  later  threshold-crossing  event,  it  re-
mains  at  least  an  open  possibility  that  this
event coincides with and constitutes the neural
basis of a conscious urge to move. Schurger and
colleagues take no stand on the exact relation
between the conscious urge to move and their
threshold-crossing event.  They insist,  however,
that this threshold-crossing event should not be
interpreted as  the cause of the movement but
rather as just one of the many factors involved
in  the  causation  of  self-initiated  movements.
This leads me to my final point.
One conceptual  problem with Libet’s  in-
terpretation of his findings and also, as Dreßing
points out, with most interpretations of neuros-
cientific  experiments  and  a  large  part  of  the
philosophical debates on mental causation and
causal exclusion lies in the conception of causal-
ity that is assumed, “namely a temporal, linear,
one-way causality” (Dreßing this collection, p.
10).  I  agree  with Dreßing’s  suggestion  that  a
different  concept  of  causation  should  be  con-
sidered, one that allows for multiple causal pro-
cesses to operate in parallel and to exert influ-
ence on one another. This is indeed the spirit of
the dynamical model of intentions I have pro-
posed elsewhere (Pacherie 2008). In particular, I
insisted that a distal intention does not cease to
exist and play a role once a corresponding prox-
imal intention has been formed (and the same
goes for proximal and motor intentions). What I
suggested is that all  three levels of  intentions
operate  simultaneously,  each  exerting  its  own
form of  control,  as well  as  operating together
with unconscious processes. Following Dretske’s
lead, we can think of intentions as structuring
rather than as triggering causes of action. On
the dynamic hierarchical model of intentions I
have  proposed,  we  can  further  think  of  the
structures set up by intentions as nested. This
means that we don’t need intentions to initiate
actions for them to play a causal  role  in  the
production of action. This also means that the
intentional online control that I argued was an
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important pragmatic function of intention may
be best conceived as a form of re-structuring,
necessary only when the initial structuring is in-
adequate. 
5 Conclusion
In her commentary, Dreßing suggested that the
story I told about intentions should be viewed
not just as a creation myth but as an attempt
to give an explanation of the function of con-
scious intentions in the physical world. I tried to
clarify exactly what I offered as merely a cre-
ation myth, namely the story given in answer to
the question “Why do we have intentions in the
first  place?”  and  what  I  offered  as  empirical
claims, namely my story as an answer to the
question “What roles do intentions play in hu-
man agency?” 
Dreßing also stresses that as an account of
the roles intentions play in agency, my story has
to meet both metaphysical and empirical con-
straints.  In  particular,  she  suggests  that  my
claims  about  the  role  of  intentions  in  action
control  makes  the  Causal  Exclusion  Problem
more pressing for me than for other myth-tell-
ers.  I  argued  that  the  problem  is  actually
equally  pressing  for  all  of  us  who want  their
views to be compatible with physicalism. I sug-
gested that Dretske’s distinction between struc-
turing and triggering causes and his view that
mental  properties  should  be  understood  as
structuring causes may offer a solution to this
metaphysical problem. Finally, Dreßing remarks
that my claims concerning the role of conscious
intentions appear to clash with certain findings
from neuroscientific experiments. In response, I
briefly discussed the most famous of these ex-
periments, Libet’s RP experiments, and pointed
out some of their limitations. I also questioned,
together with Dreßing, the conception of causa-
tion with which these debates tend to operate,
and  suggested  that  Dretske’s  distinction
between structuring and triggering causes may
also  help  to  reconcile  neuroscientific  findings
and claims about the causal roles of intentions. 
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